

Global equity strategy

STRATEGY

Research Analysts

Andrew Garthwaite

44 20 7883 6477
andrew.garthwaite@credit-suisse.com

Luca Paolini

44 20 7883 6480
luca.paolini@credit-suisse.com

Marina Pronina

44 20 7883 6476
marina.pronina@credit-suisse.com

Mark Richards

44 20 7883 6484
mark.richards@credit-suisse.com

Sebastian Raedler

44 20 7888 7554
sebastian.raedler@credit-suisse.com

A correction, not a renewed bear market

We think the period of consolidation may last another month: Tactical indicators are neutral and typically markets consolidate by 9% for 3 months around the first phase of monetary tightening (which this time is brought about by the PBOC and the end of QE). However, we believe that by mid-year, markets will be higher (our target remains 1220 on the S&P 500). Crucially, though, a clear-cut recovery in private sector credit growth (triggering a government bond crisis) or clear signs of China economically overheating would make us turn bearish.

We think the five major concerns that have spooked the markets over the past few weeks are all overstated in the near term:

- **Fears of a global sovereign credit crisis are overdone:** US, Japan and German bond yields have fallen, as has gold (hardly the sign of a funding crisis). The problems in peripheral Europe are akin to those of California in the US: Severe deflation is required, but the problem is confined. *A global bond funding crisis will not be seen, in our opinion, until private sector credit growth returns* (probably in 2011)—government interest payments as a % of GDP are still low, at 1.3% of GDP in the US. The risk, in our view, is that the UK could end up with a minority government, which might bring forward a UK funding crisis.
- **Worries about China tightening:** We believe China is likely to grow at around 10% until there is major economic, as opposed to financial, overheating, which would be reflected in a sharp acceleration in wage growth and export price inflation.
- **The end of QE:** We think banks will replace central banks as the major buyers of bonds—and overall monetary conditions are still extremely loose.
- **Obama-ing the banks:** Even assuming regulation reduces banks profitability to pre-1990 levels, this would leave the fair-value tangible book multiple at 1.1x. This implies only about 10% downside for Continental European banks and 15% downside for US banks. Meanwhile, bank lending conditions have loosened significantly.
- **Worries about US employment momentum stalling:** We think corporates have over-shed labour (hours worked are down 9% and GDP is down 2% from peak) and we believe non-farm payrolls will continue to improve.

Our fundamental view remains that global GDP growth will surprise on the upside, EPS could grow by up to 30%, the major macro and credit variables are back to where they were when the S&P 500 was at 1240, equities offer relative value (with an ERP of 5.5% on consensus earnings) as well as allowing investors to hedge against their main fears in the market at the moment (sovereign credit risk and inflation).

We would buy relatively safe companies (CDS below government, yield above government: Vodafone, BAT, Chevron, Kimberly-Clark) and quality growth (Imperial, Danone, Apple, Gilead) and avoid high financial leverage companies (ACS, Fraport, Sears, Office Depot).

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A correction, not a renewed bear market

Just a month ago, the consensus was that 2010 would not only be an up year, but that the first half would see nearly double-digit returns. We now find that clients are scared—and that all of their fears have resurfaced: sovereign credit risk in peripheral Europe, China putting on the brakes, the end of QE, recent disappointments on non-farm payroll and finally, of course, threat of Glass Steagall-type regulation for banks, which threatens to limit credit creation. We can understand these fears, but nonetheless believe clients should be buying on dips even if the tactical indicators are not giving a near-term buy signal.

Markets typically sell off by about 9% as central banks go into tightening mode:

We note that this time around, the tightening that the market is focused on is not a Fed rate hike but a raising of reserve requirements in China (after all, China and India have been responsible for 95% of the estimated 1.6% yoy increase in global growth in 4Q), aggravated by the end of QE globally.

It is not unusual to have a correction of 10% as markets anticipate monetary conditions being tightened, especially after markets have risen by more than 50%. Typically, the correction lasts for about 3 months and is about 9% (which equates to 15% of the previous rally). Indeed, this is what happened in both 1994 and 2004.

Only a modest further correction would be required for the market correction to be in line with its historical norms (an additional 3% correction is required for the market correction to be 15% of the rally).

Figure 1: Market correction around first Fed rate hike... 9% in 3 months (15% of previous rally)

First Fed rate hike	Market rally			Correction around first Fed hike			Performance 12m after correction-end
	Duration (mm)	Magnitude	Market peak	Duration	Magnitude	Correction, % previous rally	
26-Mar-84	20	44%	09-Jan-84	6.6	-12.5%	28%	30%
15-Dec-86	29	67%	02-Dec-86	1.0	-4.7%	7.0%	2%
03-Feb-94	40	61%	02-Feb-94	2.0	-8.9%	15%	14%
24-Mar-97	36	80%	18-Feb-97	1.7	-9.6%	12%	51%
29-Jun-99	9	41%	16-Jul-99	0.8	-9.7%	24%	15%
29-Jun-04	16	41%	11-Feb-04	5.9	-8.1%	20%	15%
	11	70%	19-Jan-10	-	-8.1%	12%	-
Mean	23	58%		3.0	-9%	17%	21%
Median	20	61%		1.9	-9%	15%	15%

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
Many worries are overdone

We think that the major concerns investors have currently are overdone, at least for now.

(1) Peripheral Europe... not a global sovereign credit crisis

Clients are talking about this being the beginning of a sovereign credit crisis. If this is the case, it is the first sovereign credit crisis we have seen in which not only the gold price, but also German, UK and US bond yields fell (as, incidentally, did indexed linked yields). These are not the symptoms of a sovereign credit crisis.

Figure 2: Bond yields are rising only in peripheral Europe




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We are very negative on parts of peripheral Europe (Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, as detailed our note *Peripheral Europe*, dated 5 February), but these countries only account for 14% of the European Union's GDP, about equal to the proportion of US GDP accounted for by California (which, of course, finds itself in a debt crisis and has so far avoided default by issuing IOUs). Moreover, the over-leverage of both the government and the private sectors in parts of peripheral Europe should be offset by the under-leverage of Germany (with the lowest credit-to-GDP ratio in the developed world), the undervaluation of German housing and the relatively sound fiscal position of core Europe. Germany's GDP is 50% larger than that of peripheral Europe (See Appendix 1).

Indeed, when we calculate the degree of fiscal tightening needed to stabilise government debt-to-GDP ratios for different countries, we find that very little tightening is needed in core Europe, with Germany actually still able to afford further fiscal easing (Ireland and Greece by contrast need to tighten by 9% and 7% of GDP, respectively, on a cycle-adjusted basis).

Figure 3: Ireland and Greece need to tighten fiscal policy, Germany has room to ease




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We would only worry about a sovereign credit crisis if private-sector loan growth picks up


A sovereign credit crisis will not occur, in our opinion, until there is a recovery in private sector credit growth (the usual crowding-out effect). We believe that commercial banks will replace central banks as the main funding source of government debt. In the US and Europe, banks have a low proportion of assets in bonds. If US banks increased their holdings of government bonds to a quarter of total assets (back in 1994 it was 20%—yet, now the yield curve is steeper, loan growth is weaker and regulatory and liquidity requirements are tighter), banks would fund the entire US budget deficit over the next year. The yield curve tends to lead banks’ holdings of bonds by 12-15 months.

Figure 4: US banks hold 12% of their assets in government securities compared with 20% in 1993. The yield curve leads banks holdings of bonds by about 12-15 months



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
Figure 5: Euro-area banks’ holding of government securities, % total assets



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The time to worry about a sovereign credit crisis is when banks' private sector credit growth recovers—and banks lend to the private sector, not to the government. This is, after all, what happened in 1993.

Figure 6: In late 1993, a surge in bank lending was associated with rising bond yields



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
Private sector leverage is more than twice the level of government credit (220% of GDP in the developed world). The decline in private sector debt is currently offsetting, in part, the rise in government sector debt, with private non-financial debt down 2% (\$380bn) and public debt up 23% (\$1.8trn) since Q3 2008, when private non-financial debt levels peaked. However, as soon as lending to the private sector recovers, it will crowd out lending to the government. (The UK is in a similar position, as shown in Appendix 2.)

We believe that once banks stop lending to the government, markets will require government debt-to-GDP ratios to be stable. Assuming real bond yields go to their equilibrium level of 2.5%, just stabilising government debt-to-GDP ratios on a cycle-adjusted basis will require fiscal tightening of 7% to 8% of GDP in the US, UK and Japan (see page 5 for details). This is politically and economically very difficult.

Thus the key question: When does bank loan growth turn positive?


The best lead indicators of bank loan growth—bank lending conditions in 12 months' time—are now consistent with bank loan growth turning positive at the end of the year.

Figure 7: Bank lending conditions... lead loan growth by 6 months



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
Figure 8: Bank lending conditions...lead loan growth by a year



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It is important to note that interest payments as a % of GDP are still relatively low—suggesting again that the time to worry about a global sovereign credit crisis is when private sector credit growth picks up (the CBO forecasts interest payments to rise from the current level of 1.3% in 2009 to 3.2% of GDP by 2020).

Figure 9: US government interest payments as a % of GDP still low



Source: OECD, CBO, Credit Suisse research

We believe that the UK is the G20 country most vulnerable to a government bond funding crisis because: a) its fiscal deficit is the worst of any OECD country (the cyclically adjusted primary budget deficit is 7.6% of GDP, according to OECD estimates); b) the BoE's QE programme has accounted for a larger proportion of bond purchases than that of the central bank in any other country (14% of GDP, compared with 13% in the US); c) inflation expectations in the UK have now risen to 3% over the next 5 years, which limits the BoE's ability to restart QE; and, finally, d) there is the growing threat of a minority government in the upcoming election (which has to be held by 3 June), and just the threat could cause

the Conservative Party to soften its fiscal rhetoric. If the UK were to experience a government bond funding crisis, then speculators might attack any G7 country.

The problem is that it is not obvious what the catalyst would be to deflect market attention from the fiscal problems in peripheral Europe and the overall worries about a global sovereign credit crisis in general. The potential catalysts to calm down markets' fears are:


- The ECB, concluding that Greece has done enough to address its fiscal problem, increases its emergency liquidity operations and postpones its tightening of collateral requirements. Credit Suisse's European economist Christel Aranda-Hassel believes that the ECB is likely to extend the existing collateral rules beyond the scheduled end date of December 2010, keeping a rating of BBB- as the threshold, thus allowing Greek bonds to be used as collateral for ECB funding operations.
- The IMF or the EU steps in and pushes for fiscal consolidation. We note that core Europe owns about 30% of Greek bonds and thus has a huge vested interest in limiting the extent of the crisis. Clearly, what we are seeing at the moment is a game of brinkmanship, with core Europe making sure Greek tightens fiscal policy enough.
- The Greek and Spanish politicians realise that there is no alternative to fiscal consolidation, in the same way that their Irish peers did. We find it encouraging that, according to Vima, a Greek newspaper, the approval rating of PM Papandreou has remained at 55%—and 64% of the population thought that tough measures were necessary. The opposition party, New Democracy, has also given conditional support. Public wages are set to fall by 4% in Greece, public pensions above €2,000/month will be frozen, most tax exemptions will be abolished and taxes on property and dividends increased (for the latter, from 10% to 40%), as well as the income tax rate for incomes above €60,000.

The fundamental problem in our view is that there is still too much debt (roughly \$7tn in the developed economies, on our calculations) and ultimately this can only be resolved by an extended period of low real rates and some fiscal tightening of around 5% of GDP in UK, Japan and US (adjusted for the cycle).

(2) China


We continue to believe that the time to sell China and, for that matter, all global markets, is when there are clear-cut signs that the economy is overheating. This occurs when there is sharply accelerating wage growth, as proxied by a sharp rise in export prices. This is not happening yet.

Figure 10: Chinese wage growth is still at the low end of its range



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Figure 11: Chinese export prices are still falling



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Moreover, we believe that the authorities' tolerance to rising wage inflation could be higher than it was in 2007. Rather than allowing the RMB to appreciate, it seems that Beijing has chosen to raise the salaries of domestic workers (civil servant salaries have risen by 5–15%, Jiangsu province has raised the minimum wage by 13% and during recent months most factories have raised salaries by RmB1,500–2,000 per month). This strategy should boost China's consumption and GDP, and accelerate the transition to domestic demand-driven growth.

With some 10m to 20m migrant unemployed and 6m new graduates entering the workforce per year, we suspect that it will not be until 2011 that wage growth ends up accelerating and China has to put its foot on the brakes (as opposed to taking its foot of the accelerator).


We also note that Vincent Chan, Credit Suisse's head of China equity strategy, points out that concerns over CPI inflation are overstated, as inflation is largely rising owing to government raising the 'floor price' of grain purchase by 13% late last year—the core CPI is just 0.2% yoy.

Furthermore, we would highlight that:

- *Financial conditions are still loose:* the 2010 bank lending target of RMB 7.5tn implies bank lending growth of 20% (enough to accommodate 10% GDP growth). The freeze in lending at the end of January was simply due to the fact that in the first two weeks of the year, lending grew at an annualised rate of 60%. Credit Suisse's Chinese banks analysts, Sherry Lin, highlights that, since the start of February, the large Chinese banks have started 'normal' lending practices again;
- *There does not appear to be a nationwide housing bubble,* with nationwide house prices up only 8% over the last year and the house price-to-wage ratio below that of the UK or Spain;
- In the past, the time to be worried about China has been when they have raised rates for the first time, not when the reserve requirement ratio went up.
- *There does not appear to be a shortage of capital and labour,* with foreign exchange reserves of \$2.4trn (45% of GDP) and c200 million excess rural workers

We would agree, though, that it is correct to put far more attention to emerging markets, given that they now account for 47% of global GDP.

Figure 12: Emerging bigger than developed economies by 2013E




Source: IMF estimates, Credit Suisse research

(3) The end of QE

We think the end of QE is an issue, but concerns over this should be offset by five factors:

- (1) *Excess liquidity* (proxied by the yoy growth in narrow money supply relative to the growth in the value of industrial production) is still 1.5 standard deviations above the long-run average.

Figure 13: OECD excess liquidity still 1.5 standard deviation above average



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- (2) The MPC statement pointed out that if the end of QE threatens the economic recovery, the programme will simply restart ("further purchases would be made should the outlook warrant them", MPC 4 February). Similarly, the Federal Reserve said in the most recent statement (27 January) that it is "prepared to modify" the plans for the exit strategy "if necessary to support financial stability and economic growth". Moreover, if

the US 30-year mortgage rate rose above 6.5% (compared with 5.4% currently), we think that the Fed would restart QE. Recall, a 100bps rise in the mortgage rate is equivalent to a 10% decline in house prices in terms of affordability.


- (3) We would expect the BoJ to expand QE, in the form of larger JGBs purchases or extension of liquidity to domestic banks.
- (4) LIBOR spreads, at 13 bps in the US, have fallen to historical lows, thus banks can fund themselves in the inter-bank market

We note that the ECB will terminate its fixed rate-full allotment six-month Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) at the end of March, but no end date has been set for the one-month LTRO.

- (5) *Real monetary conditions are still loose.* The two-year note yield is lower than it was a year ago (0.77 now, compared with 1%), yet the inflation swap has risen from 0% to 2.16%, resulting in a real 2-year note yield of minus 1.4%.

We also note that the Norges Bank and the reserve Bank of Australia both left interest rates unchanged at their latest meetings.

Figure 14: US short-term real rates are still negative



Source: the BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL™ service, Credit Suisse research

(4) Obama-ing the banks

Prior to 1990, US banks earned a return on tangible equity (RoTE) of 9.9% and UK banks never earned an RoTE above 10%. If regulatory authorities want to return banks back the sort of RoTE they were on prior to 1990, then they should trade on about 1x tangible book. We suspect as always that there will be some happy medium between post 1990s returns (RoTE of 15%) and pre-1990 returns. Thus, it would seem appropriate to pay around 1.1x book—not that far from where we are now (this would imply 15% downside for the US banks and 10% for European banks).

The two main factors offsetting of the effect of regulatory pressures are that asset spreads are going to be sustainably wider (although asset life is nearly four times the average duration of liabilities) and the yield curve is likely to stay structurally steep (partly because each 10ppt increase in government debt to GDP pushes bond yields at the long end of the curve up by 30bps). We doubt that this will constrain the economy's ability to grow, given that bank lending conditions are now being eased for the first time since the credit crisis.

(5) Lack of jobs growth

We continue to find that the labour shedding has been extreme relative to the fall in GDP, suggesting that US corporates have over-shed labour—peak hours worked is down 9% and GDP is down 2%.

Figure 15: US GDP and employment decline during recessions



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
Figure 16: GDP and labour market indicators during US recessions

US recession		% cumulative change			
Start	End	GDP	Employment	Hours worked	Productivity
Jul-53	May-54	-1.9%	-3.1%	n/a	1.1%
Aug-57	Apr-58	-3.1%	-4.0%	n/a	1.6%
Apr-60	Feb-61	-0.5%	-2.3%	n/a	0.5%
Dec-69	Nov-70	-0.2%	-1.2%	-4.4%	2.8%
Nov-73	May-75	-2.4%	-1.7%	-7.1%	2.0%
Jan-80	Jul-80	-2.2%	-1.1%	-3.3%	-1.1%
Jul-81	Nov-82	-2.6%	-3.1%	-5.8%	-0.8%
Jul-90	Mar-91	-1.4%	-1.1%	-2.4%	-0.7%
Mar-01	Sep-01	0.4%	-0.7%	-2.0%	2.4%
Dec-07	Dec-09	-1.9%	-6.2%	-8.9%	7.6%
Average		-1.6%	-2.4%	-4.9%	1.5%

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
The best models of employment are still consistent with a small recovery in employment growth by the end of this quarter. Furthermore, temporary employment is rising at a three-month annualised rate of 42% and hours worked have recovered strongly. Additionally, private sector (including manufacturing) job growth was positive in two out of the last three months.

Figure 17: Our model suggests non-farm payrolls should turn positive soon



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Figure 18: Temporary employment is rising at a 3m annualised rate of 42% and leads payrolls by 4 months



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In general, we think the rebound in employment might be more rigorous than is generally expected.

What about the fundamentals?

We continue to believe that investors should be buying on dips until either Chinese wage growth accelerates strongly or US bank loan growth accelerates.

Our view remains that:

On the economy, growth will end up stronger than expected (we still forecast 2010 global and US GDP growth to be 4.4% and 3.6%, respectively), given that we think:

- There is enough evidence that housing is stabilising, largely because the house price-to-wage ratio is close to a 40-year low;
- China will grow at 10% to 11%: PMIs are consistent with 10.5% GDP growth and, as above, we do not see economic overheating in China until 2011;
- corporates are very under-invested: FCF as a proportion of GDP is at a record high and the investment share of GDP is at a record low. CEO business confidence remains consistent with nearly double-digit growth in US business investment;
- corporates have overshed labour; and
- the Fed remains on the sidelines, with the two-year note yield, at 0.8%, below where it was a year ago.

On markets, we would note that:

- In the year after unemployment has peaked, markets return nearly 17% on average. It looks like unemployment has peaked in Q1;


Figure 19: Peak in unemployment and equity returns

Peak in US unemployment rate		US equities - price change after peak in UR			
Date	Level	1m	3m	6m	12m
15/09/54	6.1	5%	14%	18%	37%
15/07/58	7.5	6%	12%	23%	38%
15/05/61	7.1	2%	5%	5%	-4%
15/08/71	6.1	8%	-2%	7%	12%
15/05/75	9	0%	-3%	-1%	19%
15/11/82	10.8	1%	4%	19%	17%
15/06/92	7.8	-3%	-4%	-2%	3%
15/06/03	6.3	2%	6%	10%	15%
Average		3%	4%	10%	17%
Average all periods		1%	2%	4%	8%

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
- we forecast 25–30% EPS growth. Consensus revenue numbers look too low given the expectations for nominal GDP growth;

Figure 20: European market: Consensus revenue estimates versus nominal GDP growth rates



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
Figure 21: US market: Consensus revenue estimates versus nominal GDP growth rates



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
The huge cyclical improvement in margins does not reverse itself until there is a sharp rise in unit labour costs, which were still falling 2.8% yoy in 4Q2009.

Figure 22: Pricing power of labour does not improve unless unemployment falls below 7%



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Figure 23: Falling unit labour costs (LHS) are good for profits (RHS) inverted




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Hence, our proxy on profit margins is still very strong.


- The equity risk premium on consensus earnings is now 5.5%, versus an average of 3.6% and our target of 4.5% (our target is dependent on credit spreads and the ISM), giving about 19% upside for markets. When earnings are being revised up, we believe the market values itself off consensus, not trend, earnings. (On trend earnings, equities are neutrally valued).

Figure 24: US equity risk premium on IBES consensus and our earnings assumptions...on consensus numbers it is 5.5%



Source: © Datastream International Limited ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, Credit Suisse research, IBES consensus

Figure 25: Given where credit spreads and ISM are the equity risk premium should be 4.5%.



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Figure 26: US equity risk premium under different earnings assumptions


	12mth fwd EPS	12-24mth fwd EPS growth	3-5yr fwd EPS growth	Equity risk premium
Consensus EPS estimates	\$79.5	20.8%	9.7%	6.4%
Assuming consensus 12mth fwd EPS and 12-24 mth fwd EPS growth	\$79.5	20.8%	6.4%	5.5%
Assuming trend reported EPS of \$62	\$62	6.4%	6.4%	4.2%
Historical average equity risk premium				3.6%

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We note that long-term valuation measures (market cap to GDP, Tobin's q, P/E on trend earnings, see Appendix 3) are close to historical average levels. We think that valuation can deviate from average levels at this stage of the cycle—but we believe we are in a 'relative', not an absolute world.

- Equities are far more a hedge against the two main risks that investors fear—inflation and sovereign credit risk—than government bonds. Equities do not de-rate into higher inflation until inflation rises above 4% (whereas bonds clearly do). Currently, the 5-year inflation swap in the US is 2.2%.

Figure 27: Average P/E during periods of different inflation rates since 1871



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- Major macroeconomic and credit variables are back to levels last seen when the S&P 500 was 1243.


Figure 28: Major macroeconomic and credit variables are back to levels last seen when the S&P 500 was 1243

Indicator	Current	Last at this level	S&P 500	% difference
VIX	26.5	12/09/08	1252	18.4%
Corporate BAA credit spreads	2.63	07/01/08	1416	34.0%
CDX high-yield	635	20/06/08	1318	24.7%
ISM new orders	65.9	15/08/04	1064	0.7%
Univ of Mich - willingness to buy	133	15/01/08	1390	31.6%
CRB industrials	415	12/09/08	1252	18.4%
Baltic freight	2722	07/08/09	1010	-4.4%
Average			1243	17.6%

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
- Finally, investors are still sceptically positioned. Since the start of Q3, US\$507bn has left money market funds and US\$295bn has gone into bond mutual funds, while only US\$2.2bn has gone into the equity mutual funds. Our model of inflows into equity funds (based on the bond/earnings yield gap and price momentum) suggests that inflows should be twice their current level (average monthly inflows into equities have been \$3bn over the past three months, while our model suggests it should have been \$6bn).

Figure 29: Model update



Source: Trim Tabs, Credit Suisse estimates

Figure 30: Retail investors so far have put money into bonds – this has just started to reverse




Source: Trim Tabs, Credit Suisse research

What about the tactical indicators?

The tactical indicators are not telling us to buy or to sell. Two tactical indicators are sending us positive signals: the % of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week moving average and earnings revisions.


Figure 31: % of NYSE stocks trading are above their 10-week moving average fell to 19%



Source: NYSE, © Datastream International Limited ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, Credit Suisse research


In the 2004 correction, the market troughed when 34% of stocks were above their 10-week moving average. But compared with previous market corrections in 1994 and 2004, risk appetite and bull/bear ratios are currently higher.

Figure 33: Global equity sector risk appetite has fallen to be just above neutral level, from 1.9std above average at the end of September




Source: © Datastream International Limited ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, Credit Suisse research

Figure 32: Global earnings revisions (net upgrades) still strong



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Figure 34: Bulls minus Bears has come off its highs but is not yet depressed



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
Figure 35: Tactical indicators- currents readings compared with levels reached at 1994 and 2004 troughs

	-- Current reading:--		---2004---	--1994--	Currently
	At/ or below 2004 level?	At/ or below 1994 level?	level at trough	level at trough	
% NYSE stocks trading above 10-w week MA	yes	n/a	34.4%	n/a	fell to 19%
Equity sentiment	no	n/a	-1.36 std	n/a	-0.7 std
---put/ call	no	n/a	-4.3 std	n/a	-1.3 std
--- Individual Investors: bulls minus bears	yes	yes	-1.6	-10	-13.9
--- Financial advisors: bulls minus bears	no	n/a	9.4	n/a	16.7
---slope of implied vol skew	yes	n/a	-0.9 std	n/a	-1 std
Wilmot's risk appetite	no	no	-0.6 std	-1.8 std	-0.1 std

Source: NYSE, © Datastream International Limited ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, Credit Suisse research


We note that net corporate buying and insider buying have improved, but only marginally.

Figure 36: Insider buying is low, but on 1-week data has risen to be above the 2003–07 bull market average



Source: Argus Vickers, Credit Suisse research

Figure 37: US corporate net buying (buybacks plus cash bids activity less IPOs and secondaries) is around zero



Source: Trim Tabs, Credit Suisse research

As a result, we expect the consolidation phase to last longer. However, we believe it is too late to sell and that investors should stay overweight. We show the rest of our tactical indicators in Appendix 4.


What to buy?

We think that investors should mainly focus on two areas:

(1) *Quality growth*


Quality growth is abnormally cheap, trading on a 13% P/E discount to low quality, compared with a 5% average premium—and a 54% P/B premium, compared with a historical average premium of 77%.

Figure 38: P/E of high-quality growth to poor-quality growth is still attractive despite recent re-rating



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
Figure 39: P/B of high-quality growth to poor-quality growth is still attractive despite recent re-rating



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
Quality growth has become cheap because it underperformed in line with the fall in credit spreads and the sharp recovery in ISM.

Figure 40: Quality growth tends only to underperform when credit spreads narrow—we expect most of the improvement has occurred



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Figure 41: Quality growth and ISM new orders



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We show outperform-rated European companies that meet our quality growth criteria (positive EPS growth between 2007 and 2011 and asset turns which are superior to their peer group).

Figure 42: European Outperform-rated companies with positive EPS growth (2007–11E) and asset turns better than their peer group

Company	# yrs since 2000 that CFROI > discount rate	Asset turnover (2008)	EPS growth					CS Rating
			2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	
Capita Group Plc (The)	11.0	3.0	17%	23%	15%	12%	14%	Outperform
Compass Group Plc	10.0	4.0	9%	39%	43%	7%	12%	Outperform
Danone	11.0	1.6	6%	1%	0%	4%	11%	Outperform
Imperial Tobacco Group Plc	10.0	2.5	12%	15%	18%	11%	10%	Outperform
Nestle S.A.	10.0	1.2	17%	4%	0%	8%	11%	Outperform
Novo Nordisk As	10.0	0.4	34%	16%	15%	18%	14%	Outperform
Petrofac Limited	8.0	3.1	49%	50%	21%	36%	14%	Outperform
Sanofi-Aventis	10.0	0.3	1%	2%	15%	1%	2%	Outperform
Tui Travel Plc	3.0	2.1	-1%	28%	15%	9%	15%	Outperform

Source: MSCI, IBES, Factset, © Datastream International Limited ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, Credit Suisse HOLT, Credit Suisse research

We show the same screen for the US.

Figure 43: US Outperform-rated companies with positive EPS growth (2007–11E) and asset turns better than their peer group

Company	# yrs since 2000 that CFROI > discount rate	Asset turnover (2008)	EPS growth					CS Rating
			2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	
Aflac Inc	11.0	2.0	15%	22%	22%	10%	9%	Outperform
Amerisourcebergen	11.0	28.3	20%	11%	17%	19%	9%	Outperform
Amgen Inc	11.0	0.3	10%	6%	8%	5%	6%	Outperform
Apple Inc	8.0	1.1	73%	36%	17%	84%	14%	Outperform
Crown Holdings	10.0	1.0	12%	31%	18%	10%	12%	Outperform
Ecolab	11.0	1.2	16%	12%	8%	12%	15%	Outperform
Express Scripts Inc	10.0	4.6	42%	32%	11%	36%	28%	Outperform
Fiserv Inc	11.0	1.4	5%	24%	11%	10%	10%	Outperform
General Mills Inc	11.0	1.2	6%	11%	13%	15%	8%	Outperform
Gilead Sciences Inc	9.0	0.5	33%	25%	46%	17%	12%	Outperform
Hewlett-Packard Co	11.0	1.8	32%	24%	6%	13%	10%	Outperform
Mckesson Corp	11.0	7.8	29%	15%	26%	8%	2%	Outperform
Medco Health Solutions Inc	8.0	2.6	31%	28%	21%	19%	19%	Outperform
Pepsico Inc	11.0	1.2	13%	9%	1%	12%	12%	Outperform
Schein (Henry)	11.0	3.0	26%	15%	7%	10%	11%	Outperform

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(2) Safer than the government

Cautious investors should look for companies that have a dividend yield above the government bond yield and have a CDS spread below that of their government.

Figure 44: Pan European stocks that have CDS spreads below their government and a dividend yield above the government bond yield

Name	CDS Spread	----P/E (12m fwd) ----			----- P/B -----		Yield (2010e)		HOLT Price, % change to best	Momentum		Consensus (buy less holds & sells)	Credit Suisse rating
		Abs	rel to Industry	rel to mkt % above/below average	Abs	rel to mkt % above/below average	FCY	DY		3m EPS	3m Sales		
Pearson	55	13.9	106%	0%	1.8	-12%	10.8%	4.1%	-30.3	5.0	1.6	4.4	Outperform
Snam Rete Gas	56	12.7	82%	-6%	2.3	67%	-6.8%	5.8%	-28.7	6.8	0.5	45.5	Outperform
Brit Amer Tobacco	65	12.6	107%	31%	6.2	84%	7.8%	5.2%	-16.7	0.6	0.2	66.7	Outperform
Reed Elsevier	67	12.2	92%	-9%	11.0	163%	9.8%	4.1%	-84.4	-2.5	0.8	8.3	Outperform
Vodafone Group	72	8.9	71%	-39%	0.8	-69%	12.6%	6.2%	12.0	0.9	-0.1	35.1	Outperform
Centrica	72	12.4	108%	2%	3.5	19%	4.3%	4.8%	-12.8	1.8	-0.7	26.3	Outperform
United Utilities G	77	13.4	117%	67%	2.7	142%	n/a	5.5%	n/a	-1.2	-2.3	0.0	Outperform
Atlantia Spa	78	13.3	73%	n/a	2.7	n/a	-2.1%	4.4%	-17.7	7.0	3.6	63.0	Outperform
Telefonica Sa	111	9.5	88%	-18%	4.7	140%	12.8%	8.0%	31.3	-2.8	-0.8	34.8	Outperform
Banco Santander	137	9.7	74%	10%	1.3	-17%	n/m	5.6%	32.4	1.8	0.8	36.8	Outperform

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Below we screen for the US companies that have CDS spreads below or close to the US government and a FCF yield higher than the US government bond yield.

Figure 45: US stocks that have CDS spreads below or close to the US government and a dividend yield higher than the US government bond yield

Name	CDS Spread	----P/E (12m fwd) ----			----- P/B -----		Yield (2010e)		HOLT Price, % change to best	Momentum		Consensus (buy less holds & sells)	Credit Suisse rating
		Abs	rel to Industry	rel to mkt % above/below average	Abs	rel to mkt % above/below average	FCY	DY		3m EPS	3m Sales		
Chevron Corp	34	8.9	81%	-20%	1.6	-9%	8.9%	3.7%	41.9	3.8	-15.3	40.0	Outperform
Merck & Co	36	11.0	102%	-37%	3.5	-38%	10.5%	4.0%	72.1	1.9	71.4	55.6	Outperform
Conocophillips	38	7.8	70%	-23%	1.2	-31%	12.2%	4.1%	21.5	0.5	NM	-22.2	Neutral
Bristol-Myers Squibb	38	10.8	100%	-23%	3.3	-32%	9.1%	5.1%	45.9	1.1	-12.9	-40.0	Neutral
Lilly (Eli) & Co	44	7.4	68%	-51%	4.1	-17%	11.8%	5.5%	140.6	0.4	2.0	-80.0	Neutral
Kimberly-Clark Corp	45	11.9	79%	-6%	4.8	32%	6.7%	4.4%	11.0	-4.8	-0.1	-42.9	Outperform


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For the brave, we would suggest fund managers (Eaton Vance, Invesco), corporate spend and productivity-enhancing related sectors (technology, hotels, advertising, US capital goods) and metals and mining (Xstrata, Anglo American, ENRC, Salzgitter, Nucor).

What to sell?


Developments in Greece, Dubai and Spain have reminded us that leverage as a style has become too expensive (high leverage companies currently trade on a 20% premium to low leverage companies, compared to an average premium of 8%). Moreover, the high yield spread is consistent with a 5-year cumulative default rate below the 20-year average—this is too optimistic, in our view.

Figure 46: Highly geared stocks are still expensive relative to lowly geared stocks on P/E



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
Figure 47: Implied default rates



Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates

Thus we continue to underweight those sectors most leveraged to credit—banks and autos—and would avoid banks with high leverage and a high loan-to-deposit ratio.

Figure 48: European banks and autos are the sectors most correlated to credit



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We show a screen of companies with high leverage and low FCF yields that are expensive on HOLT. We would highlight ACS and Fraport as having earnings momentum weaker than the market.

Figure 49: European companies with high leverage, low FCF yield and expensive on HOLT.

Name	Net Debt as % of Mcap 2010	-----P/E (12m fwd) -----			----- P/B -----		Yield (2010e)		HOLT	Momentum		Consensus (buy less holds & sells)	Credit Suisse rating
		Abs	rel to Industry	rel to mkt % above/below average	Abs	rel to mkt % above/below average	FCY	DY	Price, % change to best	3m EFC	3m Sales		
Acs Actividades Co	143%	12.8	92%	43%	2.4	1%	2.1%	4.0%	-53.4	-1.1	-1.9	-23.8	Underperform
Sainsbury(J)	97%	13.2	97%	-3%	1.4	-14%	-0.1%	4.8%	-12.8	0.6	-0.5	-57.1	Underperform
Enagas Sa	101%	11.6	75%	-15%	2.3	3%	-4.3%	5.1%	-38.7	1.3	-1.0	0.0	Underperform
Air France-Klm	314%	-16.7	-34%	-322%	0.6	10%	2.9%	0.0%	-152.7	NM	0.1	-21.7	Underperform
Fraport Ag	135%	19.9	108%	25%	1.3	14%	-17.0%	3.2%	-48.4	-1.1	0.3	-12.0	Underperform
Northumbrian Wtr G	165%	12.5	88%	n/a	5.1	n/a	0.2%	4.7%	-31.9	10.4	2.0	-16.7	Underperform

Source: MSCI, IBES, Factset, © Datastream International Limited ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, Credit Suisse HOLT, Credit Suisse research

We show the same screen for US companies.


Figure 50: US companies with high leverage, low FCF yield and expensive on HOLT.

Name	Net Debt as % of Mcap 2010	-----P/E (12m fwd) -----			----- P/B -----		Yield (2010e)		HOLT	Momentum		Consensus (buy less holds & sells)	Credit Suisse rating
		Abs	rel to Industry	rel to mkt % above/below average	Abs	rel to mkt % above/below average	FCY	DY	Price, % change to best	3m EFC	3m Sales		
Chesapeake Energy	110%	10.0	91%	-14%	1.4	-12%	-20.6%	1.2%	-17.3	5.6	3.1	53.3	Underperform
Sears Holdings Corp	116%	41.3	294%	327%	1.2	-13%	3.1%	n/a	-20.6	61.6	2.5	-100.0	Underperform
Metropcs	243%	14.3	114%	n/a	0.9	n/a	-33.6%	0.0%	-99.7	-38.4	-5.7	-48.4	Underperform
Office Depot Inc	214%	-24.9	-166%	-259%	1.9	-9%	-3.5%	n/a	-54.1	NM	-0.5	-77.8	Underperform
Usg Corp	250%	-5.5	-29%	n/a	0.8	n/a	-11.7%	0.0%	-64.3	NM	-3.8	-100.0	Underperform
Saks Inc	109%	-30.9	-220%	n/a	1.0	n/a	-4.2%	n/a	-51.7	NM	-0.2	-27.3	Underperform

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
Appendix 1: Developed market leverage and house price model

Figure 51: Germany has the lowest debt level as a share of GDP of any developed country



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
Figure 52: House price overvaluation (IMF)



Source: IMF, Credit Suisse research


Appendix 2: Private and public debt

Figure 53: US private and public debt, % of GDP.



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
Figure 54: UK banks are increasingly lending to the public sector.



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
Appendix 3: Long-run equity valuations

Figure 55: Market cap to GDP




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Figure 56: US Tobin's Q



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Figure 57: The S&P price to trend EPS is 0.2 standard deviations above the long-run average



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Appendix 4: Tactical indicators

Overall, our tactical indicators are mildly supportive for equities, but they are not sending us a strong buy signal:

Figure 58: Summary of our tactical indicators

	Score	Comment
Equity sentiment indicator	◇	Equity sentiment is 0.7std below neutral
Overbought/ oversold indicator (% of stocks above 10-week MA)	◇	19%
Global earnings breadth	◇	still positive, though rolling over
Equity sector risk appetite	●	just above neutral level
Corporate net buying	●	Corporate net buying is around zero
Market breadth	●	Breadth has rolled over in line w with the market
Economic macro surprises	●	rolled over in the US and globally
Insider buying	x	Insider buy/sell ratio is low , but not a sell signal
Overall tactical message for equities	●	Tacticals are mildly supportive

◇ = Strong positive, ◇ = Positive, ● = Neutral, x = Negative, xx = Strong Negative

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The proportion of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week MA is now getting close to levels that have proved to be a mild buy signal on previous dips.

A mild buy signal on this indicator has been a reading below 20% (currently it is 19%), while a strong buy signal is when this indicator falls below the 10–15% level.

Figure 59: Previous occasions when this indicator fell to current levels (20%) and subsequent S&P performance

% NYSE stocks above their 10-week MA falling to 20%	----S&P performance---			
	1-month	2-month	3-month	6-month
18-Feb-09	0.8	10.3	15.4	25.5
24-Sep-08	-26.1	-28.2	-26.8	-32.0
26-Jun-08	-2.0	-0.9	-5.5	-32.0
10-Mar-08	6.9	9.0	6.7	-3.3
31-Jul-07	1.3	4.9	5.2	-6.8
12-Jun-06	1.8	2.5	6.2	14.2
12-Oct-05	4.8	7.0	9.2	9.4
15-Apr-05	1.0	5.6	7.5	3.9
07-May-04	3.8	1.8	-3.2	6.1
23-Sep-02	7.5	11.6	7.6	7.5
17-Sep-01	3.7	9.6	9.2	12.3
21-Oct-99	10.8	11.7	12.3	11.8
Median	2.7	6.3	7.1	6.8
Average	1.2	3.7	3.7	1.4


Source: NYSE, © Datastream International Limited ALL RIGHTS RESERVED, Credit Suisse research

Risk appetite has corrected to around neutral levels and equity sentiment has fallen below average

Global equity sector risk appetite has fallen to just above average levels, having been at euphoric levels (of 1.9std above average) at the end of September. Similarly, GEM equity sector risk appetite has collapsed to zero, from 2.3std above average at the end of September.


Wilmot's risk appetite indicator has rolled over sharply to be close to zero.

Figure 60: Wilmot's global risk appetite has rolled over to be close to zero



Source: Global strategy team, Credit Suisse research


Figure 61: GEM equity sector risk appetite has fallen to neutral, having been 2.3std above average at the end of September



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Our equity sentiment indicator (based on bullish sentiment, put/call ratio, inflows into the aggressive growth funds and slope of implied vol skew) has fallen well below average (0.7std below neutral). Out of the individual components, the put/call ratio stands out as being quite depressed, at 1.3 standard deviations below average.


Figure 62: Equity sentiment indicator is 0.7std below neutral



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Credit Suisse's economic surprises indicator has rolled over, but on previous occasions when it turned negative this was not necessarily bad for equities:

Figure 63: Global Macro surprise indicator



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Figure 64: Previous occasions when economic surprises indicator turned negative and subsequent S&P performance


CS macro surprises index turned negative	--S&P performance			
	1-month	2-month	3-month	6-month
25-Apr-08	-1.6	-5.4	-10.0	-37.3
30-Jul-07	-1.1	3.6	3.9	-8.0
15-Sep-06	3.5	5.8	8.1	5.5
23-Jan-06	1.9	3.0	3.8	-1.9
24-Mar-05	-1.7	1.9	1.7	3.8
16-Aug-04	4.1	2.7	8.9	12.1
01-Apr-03	6.7	12.2	14.4	18.6
21-Jun-02	-14.3	-4.0	-14.5	-9.4
Median	0.4	2.8	3.8	0.9
Average	-0.3	2.5	2.0	-2.1

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Market breadth has only fallen in line with the overall market momentum

It is encouraging to us that the advance/decline line has only rolled over in line with the market.

Figure 65: Market breadth (i.e. advance/ decline line) has rolled over in line with the market



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Companies Mentioned (Price as of 09 Feb 10)

ACS (ACS.MC, Eu33.92, UNDERPERFORM, TP Eu31.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 AFLAC Inc. (AFL, \$50.94, OUTPERFORM [V], TP \$60.00)
 Air France-KLM (AIRF.PA, Eu12.30, UNDERPERFORM [V], TP Eu10.80, OVERWEIGHT)
 AmerisourceBergen Corp. (ABC, \$28.32, OUTPERFORM, TP \$34.00)
 Amgen Inc. (AMGN, \$59.06, OUTPERFORM, TP \$70.00)
 Anglo American plc (AAL.L, 2361.00 p, OUTPERFORM [V], TP 3000.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)
 Apple Inc. (AAPL, \$199.23, OUTPERFORM, TP \$275.00)
 Atlantia (ATL.MI, Eu18.13, OUTPERFORM, TP Eu25.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 Banco Santander Central Hispano SA (SAN) (SAN.MC, Eu10.21, OUTPERFORM, TP Eu13.50, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY, \$24.50, NEUTRAL, TP \$24.00)
 British American Tobacco (BATS.L, 2084.50 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 2150.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)
 Capita (CPI.L, 720.50 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 910.00 p, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Centrica (CNA.L, 269.00 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 300.00 p, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Chesapeake Energy Corp. (CHK, \$25.83, UNDERPERFORM [V], TP \$26.00)
 Chevron Corp. (CVX, \$73.21, OUTPERFORM, TP \$86.00, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Compass (CPG.L, 436.90 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 500.00 p, MARKET WEIGHT)
 ConocoPhillips (COP, \$49.99, NEUTRAL, TP \$50.00, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Crown Holdings Inc. (CCK, \$25.89, OUTPERFORM, TP \$36.00)
 Danone (DANO.PA, Eu40.86, OUTPERFORM, TP Eu46.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 Eaton Vance (EV, \$28.66, OUTPERFORM [V], TP \$36.00)
 Ecolab (ECL, \$44.52, OUTPERFORM, TP \$55.00)
 Eli Lilly (LLY, \$35.31, NEUTRAL, TP \$36.00)
 Enagas (ENAG.MC, Eu15.97, UNDERPERFORM, TP Eu13.60, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation PLC (ENRC.L, 929.50 p, OUTPERFORM [V], TP 1200.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)
 Express Scripts (ESRX, \$86.44, OUTPERFORM [V], TP \$111.00)
 Fiserv, Inc. (FISV, \$46.99, OUTPERFORM, TP \$55.00)
 Fraport (FRAG.DE, Eu36.26, UNDERPERFORM, TP Eu39.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 General Mills (GIS, \$70.54, OUTPERFORM, TP \$78.00)
 Gilead Sciences (GILD, \$47.54, OUTPERFORM [V], TP \$53.00)
 Henry Schein, Inc. (HSIC, \$55.24, OUTPERFORM, TP \$60.00)
 Hewlett-Packard (HPQ, \$48.73, OUTPERFORM, TP \$60.00)
 Imperial Tobacco (IMT.L, 2068.00 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 2200.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)
 Indra (IDR.MC, Eu15.67, OUTPERFORM, TP Eu20.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 INVESCO (IVZ, \$18.61, OUTPERFORM [V], TP \$30.00)
 Kimberly-Clark Corporation (KMB, \$60.39, OUTPERFORM, TP \$67.00)
 McKesson Corporation (MCK, \$60.20, OUTPERFORM, TP \$74.00)
 MedcoHealth Solutions (MHS, \$62.98, OUTPERFORM, TP \$67.00)
 Merck & Co. (MRK, \$38.72, OUTPERFORM, TP \$47.00)
 MetroPCS (PCS, \$6.08, UNDERPERFORM [V], TP \$4.00)
 Nestle (NESN.VX, SFr48.98, OUTPERFORM, TP SFr55.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 Northumbrian Water (NWG.L, 282.20 p, UNDERPERFORM, TP 271.00 p, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Novo Nordisk (NOVOB.CO, DKr380.60, OUTPERFORM, TP DKr380.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 Nucor (NUE, \$40.46, OUTPERFORM [V], TP \$50.00)
 Office Depot (ODP, \$6.11, UNDERPERFORM [V], TP \$4.00)
 Pearson (PSON.L, 882.00 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 1000.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)
 PepsiCo, Inc. (PEP, \$61.29, OUTPERFORM, TP \$76.00)
 Petrofac (PFC.L, 985.50 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 1156.00 p, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Reed Elsevier plc (REL.L, 503.50 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 680.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)
 Sainsbury (SBRY.L, 331.20 p, UNDERPERFORM, TP 300.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)
 Saks Incorporated (SKS, \$6.74, UNDERPERFORM [V], TP \$2.50)
 Salzgitter (SZGG.DE, Eu65.70, OUTPERFORM [V], TP Eu97.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 Sanofi-Aventis (SASY.PA, Eu54.06, OUTPERFORM, TP Eu62.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 Sears Holding Corp. (SHLD, \$92.93, UNDERPERFORM [V], TP \$40.00)
 Snam Rete Gas (SRG.MI, Eu3.41, OUTPERFORM, TP Eu3.75, MARKET WEIGHT)
 Telefonica (TEF.MC, Eu17.30, OUTPERFORM, TP Eu22.00, OVERWEIGHT)
 TUI Travel Plc (TT.L, 258.00p, OUTPERFORM, TP 306.00p, MARKET WEIGHT)
 United Utilities (UU.L, 531.00 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 602.00 p, MARKET WEIGHT)
 USG Corporation (USG, \$12.32, UNDERPERFORM [V], TP \$7.00)
 Vodafone Group (VOD.L, 134.50 p, OUTPERFORM, TP 160.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)
 Xstrata Plc (XTA.L, 1028.50 p, OUTPERFORM [V], TP 1500.00 p, OVERWEIGHT)

Disclosure Appendix

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